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USA, low prices are advantageous for the consu-
mer regardless of the manner of their specification 
and as long as (!) they are above the level of preda-
tory pricing, they do not pose a threat to the compe-
tition.10 I am not addressing low prices as a result 
of applying rebates, which is a special and extensi-
ve issue.11 
o Or the monopolist (which is a “supra-category” of 
the dominant) charges excessively high prices, 
which he could not reach on a competitive market. 
This variant is addressed also in the following 
chapter. 
 
2.1  Are there theoretical arguments for an action 
against the predatory pricing? 
Low prices are generally connected with the con-
sumer and social welfare so it may seem a little bizarre 
when there are any authoritative interventions against 
them at all.12 In certain cases, however, prices may be 
low to such extent that they damage not just the less 
effective competitors (which is a necessary result of 
competition as the “creative destruction”) but also the 
competition itself. Hence the problem is how to reliably 
distinguish between the loss incurred by or pending to 
the competitors and the loss incurred by or pending to 
the competition. 
The basic objection rests in the fact that a short-term 
devastating price reduction increases prosperity only 
temporarily while as a result of long-term damage or 
exclusion from the competition, the prosperity is re-
duced also in the long term. Predatory pricing presumes 
a short-term loss of the predator and in the same time 
a reasonable expectation that after the competitors leave 
the market, who did not sustain the price pressure, the 
predator will be able to increase prices in such manner 
as to reach higher profit than before. Predatory pricing 
is a very risky procedure as losses or lost profit as 
a result of its application has to be outweighed by the 
existing (current) value of the future growth of profit; 
for this reason, it is only rare and cases, when it is suc-
cessful, are even much rarer. 13 Low prices that perhaps 
force out certain competitors from the market might 
also result from higher efficiency of a larger firm that 
enjoys economies of scale and scope.14 Competitive 
behaviour, which is demonstrated by application of 
below-cost-prices, has to be distinguished from the 
predatory pricing in particular by the context, in which 
it is performed.15 
Some authors16 state that an enterprise may force 
out a competitor by devastating prices for several rea-
sons: 
1) a large firm17 sustains larger losses than a small 
one, a unit loss is multiplied; 
2) the exclusionary pricing is worth considering only 
in the event the “victim” will really leave the 
market; it may not happen, however as when the 
assets of the undertaking do not disappear from the 
market physically, the former owner may put them 
into operation once again after the price increase or 
they are acquired by someone else; 
3) the exclusionary pricing anticipates that the 
predator has a “deep pocket” (enough sources to 
overcome the period of devastating prices) while 
his victim does not – but the victim may get third 
person’s capital to overcome the difficult times; 
4) in order for the predator pricing to be a reasonable 
strategy, it must be not just feasible but also a more 
profitable strategy than other possible alternatives 
(for example than a merger that would retain high 
profits in the industry). 
 
The success of the price predator depends in par-
ticular on whether there are high or unsurmountable 
barriers to entry the market, from which the competitors 
are being pushed e out. If there are none, having forced 
out competitors and subsequently having increased the 
prices above the competitive level by the pricing preda-
tor, other interested persons might enter the market (or 
perhaps repeatedly the formerly forced-out competitors) 
and prevent the price increase to the above-competition 
level. Consumers would benefit from the lower (below-
cost) prices in the “predatory period” and from the 
subsequent competition too.18 
A dominant may establish by its aggressive price 
policy a reputation of a predator19 and hence build 
a barrier for entering the market even though there are 
no other (legal, technological, economic) barriers or 
they are low. This might affect also other markets, on 
which the dominant operates so that the potential 
competitors’ entry to the market might be more difficult 
or made impossible at several markets and this increa-
ses the price level at several markets. 
Nevertheless, not every conduct of the dominant, 
which discourages from entering the market can be 
considered predatory;20 for example implementation of 
a new technology and its patenting or introduction of 
a new product to the market or various promoting cam-
paigns for new products and likewise.21 Such argument, 
however, may in principle not include the fact that the 
predator is generating efficiencies by this procedures. 
Even if some efficiencies could be possibly generated 
in a specific case, they would be hardly the least re-
strictive way of reaching them and they would be 
hardly transferable to the consumer in the long-term for 
the purposes of outweighing the loss caused to the 
competition by the predatory activities (which is a pre-
requisite of the exception from the ban of abuse, which 
is currently being discussed as a future option).22 
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On the other hand, under certain circumstances, one 
may be discouraged from entering the market (actually 
and in the same time intentionally) by the dominant’s 
prices, which are not below-cost ones (for example 
a sufficiently low price, still not a below-cost one, 
which prevents adequate return of investments, may 
turn investor’s interest to another market, which offers 
a promise of higher income). Low prices represent the 
costs of opportunity – the predator as well as his victim 
could sell the goods for a higher price if there were no 
predatory activities.23 
The theory of predatory prices, on which are admi-
nistrative as well as judicial decisions based, is founded 
on two prerequisites: 
o sacrificing short-term profit (the predator does not 
have profit, he is in a loss, his price is below costs), 
and on 
o the ability to increase the profit in the long term 
thanks to the greater market power after the success 
of the predatory activities (i.e. not only to com-
pensate the loss, which would make not economic 
sense, but to increase the profit and generate in-
terest on the loss as a debt of past investment– fu-
ture uncertain profit have to bear interest according 
to the relevant interest rate24). 
 
If the anticipated price predator in a dominant posi-
tion generates profit in the course of the period of his 
aggressive pricing policy, it may not be accused of 
predatory activities as no one can prove that he would 
generate higher profit than if his conduct would have 
been different. It does not matter at all that the domi-
nant forced a smaller and less efficient competitor out 
of the market – the loss of welfare as a result of such 
leaving the market by the inefficient firm will not be 
considerable. It is not verifiable to accuse the dominant 
of predatory activities (the dominant does not charge 
prices below its costs) and it would result in legal un-
certainty and arbitrariness. After all, it may lead also to 
the loss of welfare if the dominants, fearing similar 
accusations, requested a higher price (in order to have 
a higher profit margin as an argument against accusa-
tions of predatory pricing) than were it not for this 
potential threat.25 
On the contrary – if the competitor suffers loss due 
to low prices, it may be a predator but not necessarily as 
there is a number of various reasons why it is legitimate 
for the dominant to sell below its costs (sale of short-
lived goods, sale support for additional assortment and 
likewise).26 
2.2. Partial Issues 
2.2.1. Costs of the Dominant 
The very amount of the dominant’s costs, which are 
to be examined as decisive in relation to the price, is 
also a subject-matter of disputes. Round the world (de-
spite a number of reservations and specifying vari-
ants27), one usually applies the so-called Areeda/Turner 
test28. The best criterion of below-cost prices should be 
the marginal costs29. From the practical point of view, 
however, it is recommended to apply a kind of inaccu-
rate substitution of marginal costs, namely average 
variable costs.30 Areda/Turner test anticipates that 
o the price at the level of AVC or above this level 
shall be considered legal without an option of pro-
ving the contrary. This should naturally apply also 
to the price above the total average costs (ATC); 
o the price below AVC but above ATC should be 
conditionally considered legal with an option for 
the plaintiff or an antitrust body to prove the con-
trary; the European Court of Justice (ECJ) also 
starts from this premise: the so-called “AZKO rule 
“.
31
 According to this rule, prices below AVC shall 
be in all cases considered an abuse of dominance 
and the prices below the average total costs (ATC) 
but still above AVC shall be considered in this 
manner only of the exclusionary intention of the 
dominant is proved.32 This rule is too strict how-
ever as for example as regards introductory (start-
ing) prices, the price under AVC is absolutely natu-
ral and justified and on the contrary pro-compe-
titive (a new product is being introduced, a new 
competitor is entering). The courts of first instance 
also admitted this and it adjudicated33 that under 
certain circumstances, the dominant could sell with 
a loss; 
o the price under AVC should be considered illegal 
but its setter would be allowed to prove the con-
trary.34 An objective justification of the price loss 
have to be admitted in certain situations even with 
the dominant – even the dominant surely has the 
right to get rid of the stock, react to the conduct of 
competitors or (if it is less expensive) to keep in 
operation an enterprise during a short-term drop of 
demand by means of loss-prices rather than to close 
it and to start again after a certain period of time. 
 
In Europe35 (France, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Luxem-
burg, Belgium, Portugal, Greece...), there is a number 
of regulations forced by lobbying interest groups of 
small- and middle-sized businessmen, which in special 
areas ban the below-the-cost prices, cheap advertising 
and promotional sales, gifts for consumers, “two for 
one” and retail discounts under a certain limit. These 
regulations are applied regardless of the market power 
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and reason of the discount (see the Czech regulation in 
Section 2 of the Prices Act). The risks of such proce-
dures endangering the competition are obvious; protec-
tion of smaller entrepreneurs should be solved by other 
tools of the public policy (fro example tax allowances) 
that are not so dangerous for the competition and in the 
end for the consumers´ welfare. 
The problems arise also when ascertaining average 
costs. In a number of industries, loss periods are re-
peated periodically or haphazardly which do not stay 
away even from the dominant member of the market. It 
is not an economically reasonable solution to leave the 
market so that below-cost prices are charged, which 
however may not mean that the dominant is planning to 
force out or to “discipline” his competitors at the mar-
ket. Prices, which cause short-term losses to the domi-
nant, may be an indicator of the predatory pricing, but 
not necessarily. 
The Czech regulation in the Act on Protection of 
Competition 36 forbids the dominant to abuse its posi-
tion by long-term offering and sale of goods for unrea-
sonably low prices, which does or may result in a dis-
turbance of competition. In consideration of the fact this 
provision has not been used so far, one may only de-
duce that the criteria of adequacy or inadequacy as well 
as other attributes of the predatory pricing will be com-
patible with the current practice of European bodies. 
2.2.2. Predatory Intention 
In addition to the below-cost price, a typical fea-
ture37 of predatory activities is the existence of a preda-
tory intention. “Strong expressions” of businessmen in 
their internal correspondence and communication (“to 
disqualify” a competitor, “to destroy” him and likewise) 
may not be a legally relevant proof of such intention. 
Such manager is worth much greater suspicion who 
claims he wants to have good relations with the com-
petitors – it is only correct to investigate him for collu-
sive conduct. On the other hand, it is hardly possible to 
disprove existence of an explicit plan of disqualifying 
the competition by means of temporary sacrifice of the 
profit. The very intention certainly cannot be decisive 
but if there is one, “it may help the court to interpret the 
facts and to anticipate the effects”.38 
Since in the normal competition, the existence of 
a competitor is always subjectively trouble-some, there 
is a problem with identification of what is already the 
exclusionary intention and what is still a pure demon-
stration of general competitive rivalry. Therefore the 
economy anticipates objectification of the intention test 
– the thing is that the intention to exclude somebody out 
of the market is not considered commercially sensible if 
the exclusion was not actually reached – it is certainly 
better and ascertainable in contrast to the chase for “he-
mannish” statements in the internal correspondence of 
the deemed predator.39 Still it is certainly worth recom-
mending for decent companies rather to refrain from 
sending threats and creating memoranda on the inten-
tion to destroy the competition as they can be used as an 
evidence in an antitrust investigation. The evidence of 
a clear predatory strategy and not only of an internal 
communication on expulsion of the competition is sus-
picious (and it increases the chance of intervention by 
the antitrust authority).40 
2.2.3. Compensation of Losses 
The test of predation presupposes an examination of 
the ability of the deemed predator to compensate its 
losses in the long term from the period of the price 
exclusion of the competitors (it is an intention or at 
least a possibility to do so). Hence the test of the loss 
compensation concerns a special and partial compo-
nents of the predatory intent – the predatory intent not 
including the possibility of later compensation of the 
losses represents a contribution to the social welfare – 
the dominant reduced the prices….. 
In the USA, the compensation of losses is consid-
ered an integral condition of proving the predatory 
conduct (or also a concealment or a “curtain” for the 
courts for dismissing the accusation of the deemed 
predatory activity).41 On the other hand, as a necessary 
piece of evidence, ECJ requires for the dominant to 
have a real chance to compensate incurred losses. Such 
evidence is considered sufficient which proves only the 
probability (!) of the fact that the predatory pricing will 
exclude the dominant’s rival out of the market.42 This is 
in my opinion quite hazardous, too due to its indefinite-
ness as the markets keep changing and the deemed 
predator cannot forecast when the competitor will fi-
nally leave the market and whether it will do it at all 
(whether for example it will not provide temporary 
sources that will help him survive the low prices). Due 
to this very fact, the deemed predator takes a great risk 
as any economic “calculations” are impossible; one 
may perhaps apply only very rough probability esti-
mates. 
From the point of view of the European doctrine and 
decision making, it does not matter whether the domi-
nant has actually compensated its loss or it is doing so 
at the moment or whether it e was able to do it ex 
ante(!). An ex post excuse that in the end, the dominant 
did not make it (perhaps due to the fact that the victim 
proved to be a stronger competitor or because a speedy 
reaction of an antitrust authority crossed the intention 
before it could have been realized), cannot be accepted 
as a (would-be) legally relevant bonus for the predator. 
If the price reduction by the dominant is motivated by 
generating higher profit or reduction of loss, it should 
not be considered predatory.43 The criticism of the 
narrow approach to the predator’s costs44 nevertheless 
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objects that the below-cost sales by a strong undertak-
ing have to be examined in terms of the “opportunity 
costs” rather than in terms of absolute data about the 
costs; real costs of the dominant connected with the 
predatory activity might be easily overestimated. 
It is particularly difficult to diagnose possible preda-
tory activity when a new comers enter the market: the 
general (!) reaction to that is usually reduction of prices 
by the existing members in comparison with the pr-
evious period (due to the fact that the introductory 
prices of the new comers are usually lower than the 
current market prices). How shall we distinguish a re-
action of this type from the predatory price reduction? 
There might be mistakes of both types (a competitive 
reaction is qualified as predatory activity, and the pre-
datory activity is considered a standard competitive 
reaction). As it will be difficult to bear the burden of 
proof, the fears of predatory activity will be probably 
correct only if the dominant is not able to provide the 
antitrust authority with a trustworthy economic justifi-
cation of his procedure.45 
These days, the compensation of loss sustained 
during the period of low prices under the average vari-
able costs is considered an integral part of the predatory 
test in the USA46 and the European judgments tend to 
its as well.47 A defence on the basis of inability to com-
pensate the loss may not be reliable for the above-men-
tioned reasons – ECJ has ruled48 that under specific 
circumstances of one case, it was not suitable to request 
evidence of the fact that the deemed predator had had 
a real chance to compensate its losses. According to the 
Court, it must be possible to punish the predator any 
time there is a risk of excluding the rivals.. 
In one opinion, the strategy leading to a short-term 
lowering of consumer prices which is not followed by 
the corresponding higher price in the long term, should 
not be considered an anti-competitive one.49 It is disre-
garded, however that a number of price-predators do 
not act hoping in a future monopoly profit but only with 
the aim of keeping the settled level of oligopolistic 
prices that might be disturbed by an aggressive rival.50 
2.2.4. Loss of Consumers 
It is not required to prove the loss of consumers in-
curred a result of the predatory pricing. It would be also 
difficult if not even impossible. In the short term, prices 
fall during the price exclusion and the horizon of their 
subsequent growth aimed at (super)compensation of the 
predator’s loss may be very long. Moreover, in certain 
cases, the predator even fails to get to this stage for 
various reasons – but his conduct is not the less danger-
ous to the competition. The anti-competitive conduct of 
the predator may not be excused by the fact that in the 
end the consumer had profit from it (or from the 
predator’s lack of success respectively) as the prices 
actually did not rise (see the foregoing paragraph). On 
the other hand, according to Motta (in the quoted work) 
it should be admitted as evidence of efficiencies justi-
fying the price below-costs, that the deemed predator is 
active at complementary markets. 
Usual conduct at the competitive market is when an 
incumbent firm reacts to the price reduction after the 
entry of a new comer, who usually makes use of lower 
“introductory” prices. This should not be automatically 
(per-se) prohibited even to the dominant already oper-
ating at the market – if it could not react adequately, it 
would distort the market conditions and damage the 
competition (ineffective competitors would be moti-
vated to enter the market) and simultaneously the con-
sumer welfare. 
2.2.5. Price Self-Defence 
Price reduction as a reaction to competitive prices is 
therefore possible but not below the level of the average 
variable costs. While certain types of losses are justifi-
able for a prospective competitor entering the market, 
this does not apply automatically for the current (and in 
particular dominant) member of the market. On the con-
trary, even a dominant may reduce the price down to 
the level of his average variable costs even though he 
undermines the position of a small competitor or a new 
competitor thereby. A contrary rule would grossly dis-
tort the market and purpose of the competition. 
2.2.6. Prices in High-Tech Industries 
Low prices in “High-Tech“ industries have further 
economic justification regardless of the respective 
dominance of the one applying it. These industries have 
often a network nature and they achieve significant 
network externalities (the extent of the network attracts 
other members; the successful firm is the one who takes 
control over the network even though its rival may have 
perhaps a technologically more advanced solution). 
Fixed costs are high and the marginal ones insignifi-
cant.51 The one who starts building a network wins – 
one talks of the first mover advantage. Nevertheless, 
winning means spending of great efforts and invest-
ments from the very beginning, even at the price of 
a loss as the slight initial advantage can, by means of 
the “snow-ball” method, extend into a significant domi-
nance at the market. 
Hence the competition is the most intensive at the 
very beginning – then one competes not at he market, 
which is only appearing, but rather for the market itself. 
Until the would-be competitors are at this stage (and 
there is no ex ante dominance), one cannot talk of the 
predatory pricing at all (the basic condition, i.e. the 
dominant position at the market, is not met). However, 
if one of the market participants has acquired a domi-
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nant position and tries to strengthen or keep it by means 
of the predatory pricing, the law should prevent it from 
doing so and the dominant should be punished for it 
regardless of the fact that a network industry is con-
cerned. 
 Another case is the possibility of making use 
of the dominance on one market to acquire domination 
also at the “neighbouring” market with complementary 
goods. To this end, one may use of the predatory pric-
ing at the neighbour-market together with the tying of 
products.52 The answer to such situations is not auto-
matic and it requires thorough analyses. If complemen-
tary products are concerned, will their provider actually 
be interested to request lower prices for the consumer 
welfare (in order to stimulate the demand) than if this 
was done by two separate competitors?53 How does the 
consumer’s interest comply with the fact that he or she 
has to buy tied products for a lower unit price upon 
hypothetical separation of the products but for a higher 
price than the price of one single product would be 
(which is however not supplied separately – full-line 
forcing), which the consumer is interested in ? Given 
the complementary nature of the markets, is it really 
more probable that this will be for the consum-
ers´welfare? It is not unnecessarily and a priori danger-
ous - as regards the competition - when a great com-
petitor tries to enter a new product market – his mar-
keting, technological, research and development, finan-
cial and other capacities probably allow him to do what 
a small competitor could not. Nevertheless, I do no 
doubt that the predatory pricing does not belong to legal 
methods of getting established on a new market. 
3. Assessment and Standpoints 
If we strictly insist on the test of the below-cost 
price in connection with the requirement of the loss 
return, it may result in a fact that a number of aggres-
sive price conduct damaging the competition may re-
main unpunished. The proposal54 to replace these two 
tests with two basic questions (1. Has the deemed 
predator dominant or monopoly market power? 2. Is 
there a credible theory that would prove the predatory 
activities by means of facts corresponding to the theory 
– including the predatory intent?) has nevertheless the 
disadvantage of unpredictability, low legal certainty and 
arbitrary nature. 
 In the eyes of the public, predatory activities are 
probably the most striking form of discrimination by 
strong competitors at the market. In practice it has been 
proved however55 that it occurs only rarely as it is 
a very expensive strategy for the predator that can be 
substituted by less striking strategies with the same 
impact. 
Any simplifying unambiguous rules in the form of 
theses from physics56 have no place in the antitrust 
analysis of the predatory pricing. There is no place here 
for a simplifying approach only on the basis of exam-
ining average variable costs either and judicial deci-
sions do not maintain this approach either – the thor-
ough examination of conditions of entering the market 
has the decisive importance. The predatory strategy is 
not credible when these conditions are easy or are not 
made more difficult by means of predatory activities. 
There is a suspicion57 that these days, antitrust deci-
sions in this respect protect rather the competitors than 
the competition. The border between the exclusionary 
conduct of the dominant and usual hard competition by 
means of a better economic performance is not very 
distinct and its assessment depends on a number of 
factual circumstances of the particular case. Hence it is 
not possible to rely on a single “pseudoexact” indicator 
of the predatory pricing as it may happen that as a result 
of this, laws will be used to disturb and undermine the 
competition instead of its protection.58 
The are two possible scenarios59 of incorrect appli-
cation of the anti-trust regulations: incorrect accusation 
and incorrect non-accusation. Incorrect intervening be-
cause of predatory pricing may be costly as it constrains 
the price competition, i.e. the main battlefield of the 
competitive conduct. In the course of time, by means of 
market powers operation, its costs will be probably not 
reduced (in contrast to the costs of the incorrect non-
intervening60 into the anti-competitive conduct). 
As regards low predatory prices, two types of mis-
take appear – mistake I (incorrect accusation) and mis-
take II (incorrect acquittal). As regards the incorrect 
accusation, the social cost might be the lost motivation 
of the dominants to invest and to innovate as by means 
of the price regulation ex post, means may be taken 
away from them (or not awarded to them respectively), 
which they need for the economic recoupment of past 
investments and to finance other innovations. Social 
welfare is hence reduced due to the lower ability to 
innovate and to decreased incentives to risky entrepre-
neurial conduct. As regards the incorrect acquittal, an 
allocative inefficiency may emerge and in case of fore-
closed markets with high entry barriers, these effects 
may not be only short-term ones at all. 
Any exceptional price that differs from the “current 
price” established usually by the market, is a subject-
matter of the ad-hoc casuistic and value (out-of-law) 
grounded considerations, which only with difficulties 
find a reliable and unambiguous verification tests, 
whether public or private legal ones. 
The general criteria of correctness and fairness of 
the content of legal behaviour apply. They involve 
mutual bargaining power of the partners and hence 
include also the protection of the weaker party, not 
exclusively of the final consumer in all cases but 
instead of the entrepreneurs (competitors), too. 
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In the conditions when the market self-regulation 
does not work, one shall simulate hypothetical market 
conditions and compare possible prices of substitutable 
goods that would be achieved under similar business 
terms under an workable competition. 
In some respect more accurate tests of price 
“correctness” are available in the public legal price 
regulation and in the ex post regulation of the conduct 
of dominants who abuse the prices to exclude the others 
out of the market (or to prevent entry of would-be new-
comers to the market) or to exploit participants of the 
market. Both exceptionally high and exceptionally low 
prices and rebates are subject in particular to exami-
nation of their economic impact on the competition and 
consumers. Value judgments of correct or fair conduct 
are not excluded in these cases either. A normative 
value judgment specified and concretized by judicial 
decision or by a decision of the relevant administrative 
authority body is a more suitable tool of the price 
correction than an ex ante price regulation, whose both 
direct and indirect costs might be tremendous. 
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